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Abstract
Modern trade theory suggests that protectionist policies hinder exports by altering
domestic prices and production incentives. This paper examines the effect of import
tariffs on Mexican non-oil exports through a comprehensive analysis of the Mexican
trade sector, including a breakdown of the most important free trade agreements for the
Mexican economy, information on Mexican resource mobility and factor endowment,
and analysis on Mexico’s tariff structure. The paper finds that import tariffs on both
intermediate and final goods have a direct and significant effect on exports, alluding to
the existence of an anti-export bias, and argues that free trade is the most effective way to
promote exports and allow for domestic price readjustment.
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I. Introduction

Trade has enabled us to share ideas, technologies, goods and services with one another,
and has pushed economic and social development to its limit. It is safe to say that, today,
no country can survive without trading, let alone complete isolation. Through trade,
countries have the opportunity to specialize in relatively abundant goods and exchange
them with nations from around the world. In particular, both developing and developed
nations have an incentive to maximize efficiency and minimize opportunity cost by
specializing and trading. Although most countries are beginning to make real efforts to
move towards trade liberalization and adapt free trade agreements, many still have
protectionist policies that supposedly support local employment and production.

Developing countries often make the argument that tariffs imposed on their exports by
rich countries prevent them from completing their commercial goals1. In response, they
either resort to export-promotion programs (tax concessions and subsidies), which are
inefficient, or install their own protectionist policies. Tokarick (2007) argues that
developing and developed countries alike have yet to understand that their own import
protection patterns may be hindering their export performance. Through tariffs, taxes,
import quotas and non-tariff barriers, countries can distort relative domestic prices of
imports and exports, in essence creating an anti-export bias.

1 Tokarick, Stephen. "How large is the bias against exports from import tariffs?" World Trade Review 6, no. 2 (2007):

193-212.
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This paper focuses on determining the effects of trade liberalization on the anti-export
bias of Mexico through an analysis of modern trade theory and two-factor trade models.
Although research on the anti-export bias is extensive, limited research has been made
with respect to Mexico. Similarly, much of the popular analysis on anti-export bias is
outdated, for example Tokarick (2007) and Dornbusch (1992), both of whom have
leading papers on trade liberalization in developing countries. More importantly,
however, 2014 has marked the 20th anniversary of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which gives this paper particular importance and relevance in
analyzing the effects of real trade liberalization efforts with respect to modern day trade
scenarios and economic development.

This paper presents an initial analysis of modern trade theory relevant to Mexico’s
economy, and examines the effects of liberalization on Mexico’s anti-export bias through
general equilibrium models. Throughout the paper, we include a comprehensive analysis
of Mexico’s economic structure, including a brief introduction of Mexico’s trade history,
assumptions on resource mobility and factor endowment, and a breakdown of Mexico’s
tariff structure. We also estimate the relationship between import tariffs and the Mexico’s
non-oil exports, where results indicate a strong relationship between trade liberalization
and export promotion. Not only do our results allude to the effects of trade liberalization
on the anti-export bias, but they present evidence to encourage developing nations to
make more concrete efforts towards liberalization.
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II. Modern Trade Theory
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory maintains that a country’s factor endowment will determine
its relative comparative advantage in the production of goods (Carbaugh 2010). In
essence, the model suggests that trade will be determined on the relative pre-trade prices
of goods within each nation, all of which mostly depend on production possibility
frontiers and demand. Assuming that technology and demand are relatively similar
between trading nations, factor endowment thus becomes the decisive factor in
establishing comparative advantage. As countries engage in trade agreements, they will
specialize in the production of goods that require the use of relatively abundant resources
for export, and import the goods that require the use of relatively scarce resources. By
doing so, countries are able to produce outside of their production possibilities frontier, as
exemplified in Figure 1. Panel 1 portrays both nation 1 and 2’s production possibility
frontier when they are in autarky and do not engage in trade. Panel 2, on the other hand,
portrays the nation’s production possibility frontier when they specialize and trade. Point
E in Panel 2 shows that through trade, countries are able to produce outside of their
original production possibilities frontier. It is particularly important to highlight that the
production possibility frontiers assume full employment and production capacity, and are
used to analyze two-good, two-factor models (import and export sectors). Taking this into
consideration, any increase in the import sector will inevitably and directly lead to an
equivalent decrease in the export sector, and vice versa.

8

Figure 1. The Factor-Endowment Theory in Autarky and Trade

Source: Carbaugh, Richard. International Economics. Mason, OH:South-Western Cengage Learning, 2011, pp 106

Assuming a two-factor model composed of capital and labor, a country that is labor
abundant will produce goods that require labor, while a country that is capital abundant
will produce goods that require capital. Relatively speaking, the labor-abundant country
(country Z) has cheaper labor than the capital-abundant country (country Y), and vice
versa. As the countries trade, country Z will demand more capital-intensive goods,
causing country Y’s demand for capital to increase (in order to meet Z’s demand),
leading to an increase in the price of capital in country Y. Similarly, due to specialization,
country Z will produce less capital-intensive goods, lowering Z’s demand and local price
for capital. We can therefore claim that free trade leads to factor-price equalization
between the two trading countries, where Z’s originally high price of capital falls, and
Y’s relatively low price of capital rises.
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In most cases, however, trade is not free. Protectionist policies directly affect factor-price
equalization and local production incentives. Although protectionism can take several
different forms, the most widely adapted policy tends to be through the use of import
tariffs. A tariff can be defined as a tax or duty that is applied on a good that is being
traded2. Specifically, an import tariff will be a tax on a good that is imported, while an
export tariff is a tax levied on goods that are exported. There exist several different types
of tariffs, of which ad valorem, specific and compound, are the most popular3. An ad
valorem tariff takes the form of a percentage to be taxed on the price of the good, while a
specific tariff is a fixed money amount for every unit of the imported good and a
compound tariff is a combination of the two.

When tariffs are imposed on imports, they raise the price of the imported goods and
reduce consumer surplus as well as generate a deadweight loss, as demonstrated by
Figure 2. In a free-trade arrangement, the domestic price of a good will be equal to the
world price, as is represented by point PD = PS. Considering domestic demand and
supply, there will be either excess demand (shortage), or excess supply (surplus) for any
good. Imports tend to deal with shortages, where excess demand is accounted for by
imports, represented by MS. When governments impose import tariffs, they effectively
raise the price of the good, represented by Pd=Pw, causing the amount of imports to fall,
as shown by MD. This has implications for domestic producers as well as consumers, and
ultimately leads to a deadweight loss of areas b and f4.

2

Carbaugh, Richard. International Economics. Mason, OH:South-Western Cengage Learning, 2011, pp. 107
Ibid
4 Ibid
3
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Figure 2. Effect of Import Tariff on Local Economy

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States. Dairy imports in Sub-Saharan Africa. N.p., n.d. Web.
27 Apr. 2014.

Import tariffs also have a significant negative effect on exports. By raising the price of
imports, tariffs inevitably raise the price of primary factor inputs (wages and rental rate of
capital). If we continue our analysis of a two-factor two-good model, higher tariffs on
labor-intensive imports will lead to a higher domestic wage rate. If we take labor to be
mobile across all sectors, the increase in the wage rate will spread throughout the
economy and raise the cost of production of exports, which will reduce production.

Lerner (1936) argues that there is symmetry between import tariffs and export taxes with
regard to its effect on domestic relative prices. Following Lerner, we can define the effect
of an ad valorem import tariff on relative domestic prices in a small country as5

5

Tokarick, Stephen. "How large is the bias against exports from import tariffs?." World Trade Review 6, no. 2 (2007):
193-212.
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,

(1)

and the effect of an export tax on relative prices as

,

(2)

where PX and PM are the prices of exports and imports and PWX and PWM are the
corresponding world prices respectively. These two policies will have the same effect on
domestic relative prices if

.

(3)

Alternatively, if we were to assume that the rest of the world B, retaliates with import
tariffs on A’s exports, we could represent the effect of import tariffs on the relative
domestic prices as

,

(4)

creating a stronger anti-export bias than either import tariff alone, as exemplified in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Anti-export bias from protectionist policies in a two-country model

C:
B:
A:

Source: Lerner, Abba P. "The symmetry between import and export taxes." Economica (1936): 306-313.

Beginning at a point C where there is free trade, if country Z were to adapt protectionist
policies and apply import tariffs to Y’s products, production would move along the curve
to point B since local producers will focus on the production of importable goods.
Additionally, if country Y were to retaliate and impose import tariffs on country Z’s
exports, production would move further along the curve to point A, deepening the antiexport bias. It is important, however, to bring to light the difference between the antiexport bias created by a country’s own policies, and the effects of retaliation from other
countries. Given the issue at hand, this paper focuses specifically on the creation of an
own policy anti-export bias.

Several studies have analyzed tariff policies of developing countries in the fear that their
tariff structure is ineffective; see Dornbusch (1992), Balassa (1965), and Krasner (1976).
More specifically, Corden (1966) explores the effective protection rates and efficient
tariff structures. In his paper, Corden presents the basic form of effective protection rates,
where he defines the effective protection rate as the change in value-added per unit in an
13

economic activity made possible by a tariff structure relative to the absence of tariffs but
under the same exchange rate (Corden 1966). Following Corden, if we were to take the
case of an importable good j, which has only one input, i, which is also an importable,
and assume that only import tariffs are imposed on both j and i and nothing else, we
could mathematically represent the effective protection rate as6:

,
[(

(5)

)

],

,

(6)
(7)

and combining (5), (6) and (7),
,

(8)

where
= value added per unit of j in absence of tariffs;
= value added per unit of j due to tariff structure;
= effective protective rate for activity j;
= price of unit j in absence of tariff;
= share of i in cost of j in absence of tariffs;
= tariff rate on j;
= tariff rate on i.
We can see that the effective protection rate depends on tariffs on outputs, inputs and the
effective share of inputs under free trade. If we were to consider the different sizes of
tariffs on inputs and final goods, it follows that if7:
,

(i)

6 Greenaway, David, and Chris Milner. "Effective protection, policy appraisal and trade policy reform." The World

Economy 26, no. 4 (2003): 441-456.
7
Ibid
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,

(ii)

,

(iii)

,

(iv)
,

.

(v)
(vi)

The implications of this model are important in determining whether the tariff structure in
any given country is effective relative to free trade. Noting that the effective protection
rate can be either positive or negative, a negative effective protection rate would indicate
that the current tariff structure is making the market less competitive with respect to free
trade, whereas a positive effective protection rate alludes to the value added from the
tariff structure. Incorporating intermediate inputs into our model, tariffs may be more or
less effective depending on whether the intermediate inputs are taxed, and the extent of
that tax. It is important, therefore, to include an analysis of intermediate inputs in order to
determine whether a country’s tariff structure works, and not only look at final
importable and exportable goods. For example, considering an exportable with no tax or
subsidy, whose only input is an importable paying a 20 per cent tariff and whose free
trade share of the exportable is 40 percent, then the effective protection rate is – 13.33
percent, essentially representing an inadequate tariff structure. In the context of Figure 3,
by removing tariffs on inputs, the cost to produce exportable goods is minimized and
domestic prices begin to readjust, encouraging the production of exports and reducing the
anti-export bias. Visually, this would be a movement along the curve towards point C.
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Although developing and developed countries alike often adopt protectionist policies,
several studies have argued that their effects on exports are different. Tokarick (2007)
empirically examines the effect of import tariffs on exports and finds that it is in the best
interest of developing countries to reduce their import tariffs as it leads to a 20 percent
increase in exports. Developed countries’ exports, on the other hand, would only increase
by 4 percent were they to remove their own import tariffs. Many developing countries
don’t realize that their protectionist policies have significant effects on their export
sector, even more so than developed nations. A prime example of this is the case of
Brazil in the 1970s. Economists at the time argued that international demand conditions
and increased protectionist policies on behalf of developed countries were hindering the
Brazilian export sector. Applying Tokaricks’ findings to this case, we could argue that
Brazil is a small country and only accounts for a small proportion of world exports,
which gives it the ability to expand regardless of world demand conditions. Furthermore,
considering that Brazil itself had protectionist policies against imports, it would follow
that its own commercial policy was directly affecting exports, more so than developed
countries’ own protectionist policies. Tyler (1983) finds that Brazil’s protectionist
policies accounted for a direct reduction of exports quantifiable to 10 percent, which not
only serves to empirically support the theory behind trade liberalization, but highlights
the importance for developing nations to eliminate protectionist policies.

The argument for trade liberalization, particularly for developing countries, only becomes
stronger. Dornbusch (1992) presents the case of trade liberalization in Turkey. During the
mid-1980s, Turkey practically eliminated all import tariffs and quotas, liberalized the
16

foreign exchange regime and allowed for a depreciation of the Turkish Lira. By 1990,
Turkish exports had grown significantly, changing from -1 percent annually to 19.2
percent post-liberalization. Much like Brazil, trade liberalization seems to have induced
export growth and domestic price readjustment.

The models used to calculate the effects of liberalization on welfare, exports and the antiexport bias vary among studies. Tokarick uses applied general equilibrium models that
analyze exports and imports of primary goods and manufacturers alongside a non-traded
sector. The value-added of these goods is computed using a two-factor model, assuming
production to consist of labor (free to move across sectors and fully employed) and
capital (sector specific). Tokarick measures the production of outputs by looking at
value-added alongside domestic and intermediate goods, and highlights that tariffs tax
exports by altering the prices of imported intermediate goods. Similarly, Caliendo and
Parro (2012) find that intermediate goods are fundamental in demonstrating accurate
effects of tariff inclusion and reduction. In fact, their study shows that models that
include intermediate goods give results that are on average 40 percent stronger in terms
of welfare effects. It becomes crucial to therefore include intermediate goods in any
model analyzing the anti-export bias resulting from tariffs8.

Tyler’s model for anti-export bias calculations uses somewhat different theoretical
considerations. Tyler analyzes exports and domestic market sales to determine the
relative domestic price distortion. If we were to treat domestic market sales as both
8

Given limited data on tariff disaggregation, this paper presents an initial analysis of intermediate inputs on the antiexport. Further research should include a specific breakdown of intermediate good and tariffs.
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imports and non-tradable goods, and incorporate Tyler’s assumptions such that exports
and domestic market sales are substitutes in production – if domestic market prices rise in
relation to export prices, producers will shift from export production to domestic market
sales as it is now more profitable to do so – we can begin to see differences with the
aforementioned models. In this particular case, there seems to be no limitations with the
mobility of capital and labor, but rather that production depends on profit opportunities. It
follows, at least theoretically, that there are several different valid approaches to
quantifying the anti-export bias. A combination, therefore, of several general
equilibriums models will lead to adequate calculations of the anti-export bias, where the
effects of liberalization can be explained by any increase in exports in the relevant years.

Nonetheless, there are several country specific cases that go beyond general equilibrium
models, in particular the cases of production sharing and offshoring. Although the
importance of intermediate inputs has been widely discussed in most academic papers
pertaining to trade liberalization, many fail to acknowledge the dilemma with respect to
cross-border production sharing. More specifically, the models previously discussed tend
to overlook the idea that production sharing can tighten the relationship between exports
and imports. Take, for example, the case of the Mexican auto industry, where
manufacturing factories import intermediate goods and components, assemble, and
export final goods back to the United States. As the United States demands more final
goods and Mexican exports grow, in this case from the assembly and exportation of the
final goods, the Mexican auto-makers will require more intermediate components from
the United States, which leads to an increase in imports. In essence, production sharing
18

leads to the scenario where exports bring in imports, and create a net trade balance.
Feenstra and Hanson (2001) and Arndt (2010) explore the importance of this relationship
in terms of intra-industry trade. Specifically, Arndt (2010) argues that there is a direct
link between exports and imports in intra-industry trade that alters the trade balance and
reduces the sensitivity of the trade balance to exchange rate movements. Furthermore, if
this particular type of trade, which is related at both the industry and product level, is not
accounted for in models, the importance of the effect of tariffs on exports may be
overstated. This paper, however, primarily uses general equilibrium models given the
availability of data9.

9

A brief analysis of intra-industry trade is included, but only touches the surface of the larger issue at hand. A
limitation of this paper is the exclusion of proper production sharing analysis.
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III. Trade Liberalization in Mexico

a. Data

This paper uses data from the Banco de Mexico, the National Institute of Statistics and
Geography (INEGI), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. From the Banco de Mexico,
we use monthly data for Mexican exports, imports and revenue from import tariffs from
1980-2014. From the Banco de Mexico we use historical exchange rates between the
Mexican peso and the US dollar for the same period, and from INEGI, we collect
information on sector productivity and population production by sector. We use data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to obtain data on historical US GDP levels from
1980-2014.

The variables presented in this paper were determined from analysis of trade
liberalization theory and past papers. In constructing them, we define Mexican exports
and imports as non-oil exports and imports of goods only. This was determined because
oil prices are subject to international pricing, and this paper focuses on the effect of
liberalization with respect to domestic prices. The exchange rate is defined as the nominal
exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the peso since 1980, and is measured as
Mexican pesos per United States dollars. Because more than 80 percent of Mexican
exports go to the United States, and the peso was pegged to the dollar for a large section
of these data, we limit the exchange rate to peso per dollar instead of adding other
currencies. Lastly, US GDP is defined as GDP in terms of 2009 real dollars. Since non-
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oil exports and imports were measured using 2009 dollars, we wanted to minimize and
control for any variations that a different GDP measure might entail.

Simple analysis of the data demonstrates several important changes with respect to the
exchange rate and Mexico’s trade balance. Figure 4 presents a summary of the exchange
rate. The major events affecting the exchange rate are during 1986, where economic
challenges in Mexico caused the exchange rate to go above 1 for the first time, and
during the end of 1994, where a devaluation of the peso caused a rapid increase in the
exchange rate.

Figure 4. Variation in Exchange Rate (MX Peso/US Dollar)
16.00
14.00
MXN/USD

12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
Dec-62

Aug-76

May-90

Jan-04

Sep-17

Source: Banco de Mexico, Estadisticas en Tipo de Cambio Peso a Dollar.

Figure 5 presents Mexico’s trade balance, which can be measured by the relationship
between price and quantity of exports and imports. The data indicates that, up until 1994,
Mexico had a trade deficit, where imports were larger than exports with the ratio
hovering at around 0.7. In 1994, with the signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the trade deficit fell and Mexico’s balance of trade jumped to a
ratio of around 1.0.
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Figure 5. Mexican Balance of Trade, 1993-2013
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, Estadistica Balanza Comercial

Summary statistics for other variables are presented in the following sections.
Specifically, see Figure 10 for a breakdown of intermediate tariff rates and their
respective phase-out.

b. History of trade liberalization in Mexico

Trade liberalization in Mexico has been a subject of much debate. Although in the last
decade Mexico has joined and signed over twelve free trade and economic
complementation agreements, it was not until 1986 when Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)10, that trade liberalization became a realistic
economic approach. Mexico’s entry into the GATT set the ground for the introduction of
other free trade agreements, mainly with the European Union and North America. The
GATT established the origins of trade liberalization in Mexico, requiring certain

10 Kehoe, Timothy J. "A Review of Mexico's Trade Policy from 1982 to 1994." World Economy - London- 18 (1995):

130-135.
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ownership and accountability with the international community to discipline its tariff
behavior.

11,

If we define economic openness as

analysis of pre- and post- GATT

entry (1985 and 1987) will show that Mexico’s openness changed from about 20 to 30
percent, as highlighted in Figure 6. Although a modest increase, the GATT was important
in demonstrating Mexico’s attitude towards liberalization and serious economic
development. Interestingly, the GATT demonstrated the governments’ limitations in
creating drastic commercial policy reforms and highlighted the importance of investing in
the export sector rather than the import sector, marking the beginning of the end of
import substitution.
Figure 6. Mexico’s Economic Openness
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, Estadistica Balanza Comercial

11 Carbaugh, Richard. International Economics. Mason, OH:South-Western Cengage Learning, 2011, pp.34

23

In 1987, Mexico created the Pacto de Solidaridad Economica (Pact for Economic
Solidarity)12, which added credibility and value to Mexico’s liberalization attempts. The
Pact complemented the GATT by putting a 20 percent tariff ceiling on practically all
economic sectors13, despite it not being an international requirement. Furthermore, the
Pact’s signaling effects encouraged further investment into the export sector by economic
agents.

The next and arguably most effective trade agreement came in 1994 with the
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Visually represented in
Figure 6, NAFTA caused a drastic change in economic structure, leading to a jump in
openness of roughly 20 percentage points (30 to 50 percent) in only a couple years. The
reasons for NAFTA’s success in structure changes may be particularly concentrated
around Mexico’s proximity and commercial relationship with North American countries
(Canada and USA). Numerically, Mexico’s exports grew by 30 percent during 1995,
contrasting with 12 and 17 percent annual growth in the years leading to NAFTA14.

Several trade agreements have been negotiated and signed since NAFTA, of which the
Mexico and European Union Free Trade Agreement (TLCUEM) stands out the most. To
date, Mexico has twelve Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with 44 countries, making it one
of the most open economies in the world (Figure 7). Interestingly, these free trade
agreements have not had the impact of NAFTA with regard to structural economic
12

Kehoe, Timothy J. "A Review of Mexico's Trade Policy from 1982 to 1994." World Economy - London- 18 (1995):
130-135.
13

Ibid

14

Calculated using export information from INEGI
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change. Although no particular reason for their modest performance can be singled out,
an analysis of the countries with which these FTAs were negotiated leads to the
understanding that pre-treaty trade must have been small and limited. More specifically,
it is unlikely that an FTA with Peru, for example, would have a large effect on openness
when total trade with Peru is and has been relatively small with respect to overall national
trade.

Figure 7. Timeline of Mexican Free Trade Agreements

Source: Secretaria de Economia, Tratados de Libre Comercio Mexicanos

Using the same measure of openness as in Figure 6, we can test to see which commercial
event had the biggest effect in changing Mexico’s economic structure using a simple
OLS rmodel with the following form:
Opennesst = α1GATTt + α2NAFTAt + α3TLCUEt + εt,

(9)

where openness is measured at time t and GATTt, NAFTAt, TLCUEt are binomial
variables that take the value of 1 at 1986, 1994 and 2000 respectively.
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Table 2. Structural Effect of Major Agreements
GATT
NAFTA
TLCUE

0.012
(0.022)
0.097***
(0.022)
-0.026
(0.022)

Note: *,**,*** are significant at the 10,5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Standard Errors are presented in
parenthesis.

Table 2 shows that NAFTA was the event with the biggest positive impact with respect to
the structural change of Mexico’s openness and trade policy. Furthermore, the results also
indicate that neither Mexico’s FTA with the European Union (TLCUE) nor any other
FTA’s after NAFTA have had an impact on structural change, alluding perhaps to the
limitations in size of pre-treaty trade.

c. Resource Mobility and Factor Endowment in Mexico

A major component of any two-factor model is factor endowment and resource mobility.
Many models make the assumption that labor and capital can be allocated costlessly
across sectors, such as Caliendo and Parro (2012). Although this assumption simplifies
general equilibrium models and allows for concrete analysis of production and trade, it is
important to acknowledge that in reality labor mobility is costly and ineffective,
particularly in developing countries. Taking the case of Mexico, a simple analysis of
production/GDP and working population/production sector ratios shows that current
labor mobility is slow and, in particular sectors, labor is extremely ineffective. Figure 8
represents the production/working population ratio for some of the major economic
sectors of Mexico. The key component of this figure lies in the low ratio of agriculture;
about 0.2 for any given year. The implications of this ratio are that, despite agriculture
26

being quite small in terms of total production to GDP, there is still a large percentage of
the working population specialized in this sector. Either there is little opportunity for
labor mobility within the unskilled sectors, or labor is simply very unproductive.

Figure 8. Production to Working Population Ratio in Major Sectors
Production/Population Ratio
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, Produccion Sectorial y PIB

On the other hand, we find the expected ratios in sectors like manufacturing and
construction, with values at approximately 1.0. These sectors are often associated with
higher degrees of training and can arguably be classified as skilled labor. In these sectors,
production and working population practically go hand in hand, alluding to stronger labor
efficiency and mobility15.

15

If we were to isolate data of population by sector, we would expect to see movement from agriculture to
manufacturing and services, alluding to the migration of rural to urban areas. The production ratios don’t change
because population migration and production are inter-correlated. No data is available pre-2005, but we would expect
to see major migration changes beginning with the signing of NAFTA and onwards.
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d. Mexico’s tariff structure

Corden’s discussion on effective protection rates highlights the importance of analyzing
Mexico’s tariff structure, particularly regarding intermediate inputs. Considering the
magnified effects of intermediate input tariffs on the production of both exportable and
importable goods, it is important that we decompose Mexico’s tariff structure by types of
good. As presented in Figure 9, intermediate inputs have been and continue to be a major
component of total imports, climbing to levels near 80 percent in the last decade.
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Figure 9. Share of Intermediate Goods in Total Imports

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, Estadistica Balanza Comercial

The previous sections argue that NAFTA has been the most important free trade
agreement for Mexico up to date. Considering NAFTA’s members, the United States and
Canada, two major developed nations, it is safe to assume that the tariff structure follows
Corden’s effective protection rate and structure. Although many developing countries
often make tariff structure mistakes, this paper assumes that Mexico’s tariff structure is
adequate 16 . Despite exact data on specific tariff disaggregation by type of good, this

16

Data on the share of inputs in the cost of the final good under free trade (a ij in Corden’s model) could not be
collected for this paper. Therefore, an actual calculation of the effective protection rate was not possible.
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paper uses the ratio of intermediate goods to total imports as a proxy for tariff rates on
intermediate goods, which is presented in figure 10.
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Figure 10. Effective Tariff Rate for Intermediate Inputs

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geographia, Estadistica Balanza Comercial

Two important spikes occur simultaneously between 1994 and 1995 in Figure 9 and
Figure 10. Specifically, the year of and the year after NAFTA was signed, we can see the
share of intermediate inputs in total imports increase from about 70 to 80 percent and the
tariff rate decrease from about 3.5 to 2 percent. Returning to modern trade theory models,
a decrease in the tariff rate of intermediate inputs will directly affect domestic prices and
costs of exportable and importable goods. Assuming the majority of the intermediate
input imports are used for exportable goods, a reduction in the tariff rate will minimize
production costs and shift domestic prices and domestic production towards the
exportable sector. As Figure 3 alludes to, this reallocation of prices and resources has a
major effect on the reduction and potential elimination of the anti-export bias. A visual
representation of the relationship between tariff reduction of intermediate goods and nonoil exports speaks to the reduction and possible elimination of the anti-export bias, as
presented in figure 11.
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Figure 11. Effect of Tariff Rate of Intermediate Inputs on Exports, 1993 - 2013
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We expect to see Mexico’s exports continue to grow despite tariffs reaching a minimum.
The key of this graph is to not only to highlight the immediate relationship between
tariffs and exports, but to speak to the importance of sustainable free trade agreements.

e. Empirical Approach

Formally, the empirical model we estimate using OLS takes the form:
EXPt = α + β1Tarifft +β2GDPt +β3ERt + εt ,

(10)

where Tarifft is the implicit level of import tariffs at period t, GDPt is the real GDP level
of the United States at t, ERt is the effective exchange rate at period t, and EXPt are the
Mexican non-oil exports at period t.

Specifically, we use non-oil exports as a proxy for the reduction of any anti-export bias.
As presented in Figure 3, if a country’s exports increase, the relative prices of importable
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and exportable goods should adjust. In other words, domestic producers will shift from
the production of imports to the production of exports as the price incentives are now
efficiently allocated. Furthermore, it is important that one analyzes non-oil exports only
given that oil exports are subject to global pricing and would not properly estimate the
domestic price readjustment. The exchange rate must also be included in the model given
that differences in the exchange rate affect exports and imports. Suppose that the US
Dollar appreciates with respect to the Mexican Peso. This would effectively make US
products more expensive relative to Mexican goods, and cause Mexican exports (US
imports) to increase. By controlling for any changes in the exchange rate, one becomes
more confident that the changes in non-oil exports are due to trade liberalization and its
subsequent elimination of the anti-export bias. Similarly, it is important that we include
US real GDP in our model, and thereby control for any ‘natural’ increases in demand of
Mexican exports and US consumption in general. Lastly, the model includes a measure of
import tariffs, which is a measure of direct liberalization. Import tariffs include both tariff
rates on intermediate goods and general imports. We expect to see a strong negative
relationship between import tariffs and exports, demonstrating the effect of trade
liberalization on domestic price readjustment. All variables measured are continuous and
logarithmic.

The results, presented in Table 3, indicate that US GDP, general tariffs (tariffs applied on
final imports), and intermediate tariffs (tariffs applied on intermediate inputs) have a
significant effect on exports. As expected, US GDP and exports are positively related; an
increase in 1 percentage point of GDP is associated with an increase of 1.9 percentage
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points in exports. The results also indicate that the relationship between general tariffs,
intermediate tariffs and exports is negative and significant; a decrease of 1 percentage
point in general tariffs and intermediate tariffs is associated with an increase of 0.27 and
0.29 percentage points of non-oil exports respectively. We find that the effect of
intermediate tariffs is about 10 percent strong than the effect of general tariffs, supporting
previous research on the strength of intermediate goods and tariff rates on export
production. Although we find that the exchange rate has no significant effect on exports
in this particular model, we cannot ignore the theoretical considerations of its impact on
Mexican non-oil exports.

Table 3. Effect of GDP, Import Tariffs and Exchange Rate on Exports
US GDP
1.888***
(0.988)
General Tariff
-0.266***
(0.054)
Intermediate Tariff
-0.293***
(0.057)
Exchange Rate
-0.201
(0.138)
Note: *,**,*** are significant at the 10,5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Standard Errors are presented in
parenthesis.

As discussed above, production sharing can distort the model by making the trade
balance less sensitive to any changes in the exchange rate. In order to account for any
effects of production sharing, we run regressions of non-oil exports separated by the main
sectors in production. Specifically, we were able to obtain information on manufactured
exports, where production sharing should theoretically have a large effect. Within
manufactured goods, we analyzed the auto industry given Mexico’s increasing share of
total car exports to the United States and the rest of the world. Table 4 presents the results
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from additional regressions looking at the manufacturing sector exports and auto industry
exports. Comparing the results of the manufacturing sector (1) to our initial regression
presented in Table 3, we see minimal changes with respect to the effect of tariffs on
exports. It is safe to assert that Mexican exports from the manufacturing sector behave in
similar ways to general non-oil Mexican exports. The main differences stand out with
respect to the exchange rate, which becomes significant under regression (1); an increase
of 1 percentage points in the exchange rate is associated with a 0.25 percentage point
increase in manufacturing exports.

Table 4. Effect of GDP, Import Tariffs and Exchange Rate on Manufacturing
Exports
US GDP
General Tariff
Intermediate Tariff
Exchange Rate

Manufacturing Sector
(1)
1.977*
(1.013)
-0.266***
(0.056)
-0.293***
(0.059)
0.249*
(0.141)

Auto Industry
(2)
1.325
(1.449)
-0.302***
(0.079)
-0.328***
(0.084)
0.138
(0.202)

Note: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Standard Errors are presented in
parenthesis.

Results from (1) also contrast with the results from the regression specific to the auto
industry (2) as both the exchange rate and US GDP lose significance. Although the
reasons behind the loss of significance of US GDP are not clear, there are theoretical
explanations for the change in the exchange rate. As previously mentioned, intra-industry
trade creates a direct link between exports and imports, and tightens the trade balance.
Specifically, the direct link between exports and imports makes the trade balance less
responsive to changes in the exchange rate, given that external factors will have less of an
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effect on their relationship. In terms of the auto industry, which is intense with respect to
production sharing, the particularly strong link between exports and imports leads to a
decrease in the responsiveness of exports to exchange rates. The effects of production
sharing on the Mexican auto industry are also visible in the increase of the effect of tariffs
vis-à-vis manufacturing and general exports; a decrease of 1 percentage point in general
and intermediate tariffs is associated with an increase of 0.30 and 0.33 percentage points
in exports respectively. As theory suggests, if intra-industry and inter-product trade is a
large share of total trade, as is the case for the auto industry, the effects and importance of
the anti-export bias in overall trade may be overstated17.

The implications of these results are threefold. To begin with, one could argue that, given
the results at hand, production sharing is not dominant in the manufacturing sector as a
whole, but rather in very specific sub-industries such as the auto industry. Second, that
production sharing in terms of general exports may be larger than originally expected,
accounting for the lack of significance in the exchange rate. Third, and most importantly,
that trade liberalization contributes to the reduction of the anti-export bias as estimated by
changes in exports. Effectively, reductions in both the general and intermediate tariff
rates lead to domestic price readjustment within the Mexican import and export sectors.

17

Further analysis including more concentrated data is necessary to understand the full implications of production
sharing with respect to Mexican trade. We would expect to see additional effects on exports and exchange rates as
exports continue to be divided by sector and industry.
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IV. Conclusion

This paper has presented the most relevant theoretical considerations with respect to
modern trade, focusing specifically on the applicability of general equilibrium models on
trade analysis. Having acknowledged several exceptions and limitations to general
equilibrium models, this paper has presented a comprehensive analysis of Mexico’s
economy and trade structure in an attempt to justify all theoretical assumptions.
Specifically, this paper begins its analysis by looking at the effect on economic openness
and structural change of the biggest free trade agreements in Mexico. We find that
NAFTA was the most significant free trade agreement in terms of its effect on structural
change, and base the core of Mexico’s trade analysis on it thereafter. Our analysis
continues with a breakdown of Mexico’s factor mobility, where we find that the
agriculture sector is highly unproductive considering its high labor availability, and
allude to possible issues with respect to labor mobility in regard to unskilled labor.

A central message of this paper is establishing the relation between import tariffs and
exports. We ultimately find that there is a strong negative relationship between import
tariffs and exports, and argue that own policy protectionist policies directly affect the
anti-export bias. Our results indicate that there is a difference between import tariffs on
general goods and intermediate inputs, supporting the theory behind effective tariff
structure and production. Empirically, we find that tariffs on intermediate inputs are
around 10 percent stronger than tariffs on general imports with regard to their effect on
exports. Specifically, we find that a reduction of 1 percentage points in general and
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intermediate tariffs is associated with an increase in non-oil exports of 0.27 and 0.29
respectively. This is strong evidence for the readjustment of domestic prices and the
effective reduction of the anti-export bias. The implications of this analysis, however,
serve not only to highlight the importance of proper tariff structure, particularly regarding
intermediate inputs, but to encourage developing nations to remove protectionist policies
as to promote export production. Through protectionist policies, countries effectively
alter domestic prices and enhance any existing anti-export bias. The key for export
growth, therefore, lies not under specific export promotion programs, but under trade
liberalization efforts altogether.

Although this paper has attempted to present empirical analysis that is fully supported by
theory, there are several limitations that could not be accounted for. Future improvement
of this subject will need to include more in depth analysis of production sharing given its
particular importance to Mexico’s economy. Although data for a proper breakdown of
exports by sectors or for the relevant share of production sharing to total trade was not
available, we can assume that the effects of exchange rate and tariffs will vary between
sectors according to the degree of production sharing; sectors with significant production
sharing will likely have less responsive exchange rate effects and slightly overestimated
effects of tariffs on exports. Similarly, further disaggregation of tariffs and imports is
necessary to be able to properly comment on Mexico’s tariff structure. Lastly, full
information on Mexico’s factor endowment and mobility would enable us to talk about
production and specialization with more confidence, and allow us to do a complete
analysis of effects of trade in the Mexican economy.
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